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Abstract  
This cursory literature review discusses the direct and indirect effects of institutions, 
governance, and democracy on economic growth, and the following conclusions are
drawn. First, institutions and governance have a positive effect on growth. Even 
reforms that are less than comprehensive can stimulate, though not sustain, growth. 
Second, democracy neither promotes nor hampers growth directly. It secures stability 
and resilience in growth. It also exerts impacts on sources of growth but its net effect 
remains inconclusive. There remains unanswered the question of why institutions 
and governance matter but not democracy does not. The difference may be partly due 
to negative effects on investment and labor supply as well as the low credibility of 
young or partial democracies.  
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The Political Economy of Growth: A Review 
 
Yasushi Hazama 
 
Recently, economists in search of sources of growth have extended their reach more into 
the political field than into the economic arena. Political scientists have also been 
stimulated by this surge of interest in the political economy of growth. The topic carries 
significant importance since newly democratized countries do not necessarily perform 
well so far as their economies are concerned. This paper reviews the most recent 
arguments and the evidence regarding the effect of institutions, governance, and 
democracy on long-term economic growth. The outline of the paper is as follows. First, 
the dependent and independent variables are conceptually and operationally defined. 
Second, two methodological problems encountered by economic growth research are 
highlighted. Third, major empirical findings on the effect of institutions, governance, 
and democracy on economic growth are presented. In the last section, tentative 
conclusions and implications for future research are drawn.  
 
Definitions and measurements 
In the literature reviewed by this paper, although the definitions of the three political 
determinants of growth partially overlap, there are distinct conceptual differences. Good 
institutions ensure property rights and access to economic resources for a broad section 
of society (Acemoglu et al. 2005).1 More recently, institutions have tended to be 
operationalized as a protection against expropriation risks (see cross-country data such 
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as those of Political Risk Services) or as constraints on the executive branch of 
government (see Polity data by Ted Gurr), following arguments deployed by Acemoglu 
et al. (2001).2  
    Governance, in its most-widely shared definition, consists of (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political stability and physical security, (3) government effectiveness, 
(4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. It can be measured 
by a composite index based on multiple cross-country surveys conducted at macro or 
micro levels (Kaufmann et al. 2007).  
    Democracy can be said to exist when there are competitive elections, constraints 
on executive power, and political participation. It is usually measured by Freedom 
House or Polity datasets. In practice, democracy is most often treated as a dichotomous 
variable, although this approach may have neglected the increasing number of hybrid 
regimes (Epstein et al. 2006). 
The dependent variable, long-term economic growth, is more difficult to deal with 
than would first seem to be the case. The growth literature seems to agree that GDP 
measurement has to be adjusted for (1) the base year effect, (2) cross-national price 
differences, and (3) population growth (Scruggs 2001, 123-4). Accordingly, in most of 
the studies covered in this review, long-term growth is measured by real GDP per capita 
at purchasing power parity for a given year, or real GDP growth per capita for a given 
period (usually a decade), with initial GDP controlled for.   
 
Methodology 
There are two major methodological problems that confront researchers  working on 
the topic under discussion. The relevant literature has dealt with these challenges in 
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such a way as to obtain valuable findings. First of all, even if institutions, governance, 
and democracy are statistically related to economic growth, that does not mean that a 
straightforward line of causation runs from the former to the latter. What is being 
referred to here is the problem of simultaneity. Under this kind of circumstance, it is 
common to use an instrumental variable that represents the major independent variable 
but is not related to the dependent variable, and to run a two-stage ordinary least square 
regression (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; Keefer 2005; Licht et al. 
2007). Another approach is to use identification through heteroscedasticity (IH), as 
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) have done, that takes advantage of differences in the 
variances of error terms between sub-samples (such as between colonized and 
non-colonized countries) of the dataset.  
A second problem is that for case studies, there are too many variables for too few 
cases. It thus becomes difficult to explain the growth performance of particular 
countries. In these cases, a cross-sectional analysis with a country dummy can indicate 
that there are factors unique to that country. These factors can then be examined by 
qualitative (and comparative) methods (Acemoglu et al. 2003; Subramanian and Roy 
2003; Kaufmann et al. 2003). This approach bridges the gap between cross-country 
analysis and individual country analysis and yields findings that have a greater general 
relevance. 
 
Institutions  
A growing body of literature has emphasized the quality of institutions as a factor that 
significantly affects long-term growth. Most influential of all, Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
have demonstrated that the colonial powers on the one hand built good institutions in 
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countries into which they wished to immigrate, while on the other hand introducing 
exploitative institutions when harsh natural environmental conditions discouraged 
settlement by colonists. Settler mortality rates were used as an instrumental variable to 
measure the quality of current institutions.3 With regard to Western Europe, analyses of 
historical panel data have shown that Europe’s economic emergence between the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries owed much to Atlantic trade and that its expansion 
was faster in countries where political institutions exerted more checks on the growth of 
monarchical power, thus preventing the emergence of royal monopolies and protecting 
the property rights of the merchants (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). The effect of 
institutions on growth has also been confirmed at the industry level, cross-nationally 
(Claessens and Laeven 2003).  
   Besides the general factors shown above, it is also possible to delineate factors 
unique to specific countries. As an example, Acemoglu et al. (2003) begin their 
investigation with a cross-country statistical analysis to show that institutions account 
for Botswana’s success. However in the same study, another cross-country analysis of 
the determinants4 of good institutions  left large Botswana dummies, indicating that 
unique factors have been at work. The ensuing explanation turned to a historical account 
of the inheritance of pre-colonial institutions that ensured popular participation and 
constraints against the accumulation of excessive power. This conclusion is 
cross-checked with other African country cases.  
Adopting a similar approach, Subramanian and Roy (2003) have argued that 
Mauritus’s uniqueness, attested by the significant effect of the Mauritius dummy among 
determinants of economic growth, including economic and institutional variables, lay in 
ethnic fragmentation. In particular, the economic-elite minority (the French), who 
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dominated the sugar sector, avoided nationalization or heavy taxation, typical of 
monoculture states, by sharing their rent with the political elite majority (Indians), who 
occupied the public service sector. On the other hand, the non-Indians’ fears of majority 
tyranny after independence from Britain were allayed by the introduction of fair and 
competitive elections. Kaufmann et al. (2003) also base their analysis of Bolivia on 
cross-national determinants of economic growth. 
Institutions die hard but even their partial reform may stimulate growth. Rodrik 
(2005) argues that by contrast with the maintenance of economic growth, the initiation 
of growth does not require comprehensive institutional reform, as has been advocated 
by the Washington consensus. Case studies have provided evidence that rapid economic 
growth has followed mild and short-term institutional changes. For instance, in China, 
the introduction of local public-private enterprises guaranteed in de facto terms 
protection from expropriation while a two-track market and trade liberalization provided 
market incentives which minimized the number of losers and thus reduced opposition to 
change (Qian 2003). Corruption has been a dominant problem in Indonesia but 
deliberate policy measures such as the transfer of oil revenues to the agricultural sector 
played a fundamental role in the country’s economic growth (Temple 2003). Similarly, 
in Latin America since the 1980s, market reforms 5  have fallen short of being 
comprehensive. Nevertheless, economic growth has been higher in countries that 
implemented extensive reforms than in those with limited reforms (Corrales 2003).  
 
Governance 
As is the case with institutions, governance also has a positive effect on growth (Burki 
and Perry 1998; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002), but governance is a more debatable matter 
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than institutions probably because the definitional scope of governance is broader than 
that of institutions. In response to the proponents of the “virtuous cycles” argument, 
who believe that economic growth will improve governance in the long run, Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2002) have shown that per capita income has a weak or even negative effect 
on governance, which suggests that the elite abuses the state in order to capture a large 
share of economic growth. It has also been argued that corruption may encourage 
economic growth since (1) bribery smooths business transactions and boosts sales and 
(2) what matters is not corruption per se but the unpredictability of its costs and benefits. 
The results of a firm-level analysis using World Business Environment Survey data, 
however, rejected these two hypotheses on the benefits of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 
2003).  
Scholars have further sought to discover what determines the quality of governance 
by focusing on democracy, legitimacy, and culture. Keefer (2005) found that continuous 
years of competitive elections are a major determinant of governance in young 
democracies, even after controlling for relevant variables. Englebert (2000) also claimed 
that governance, which has had a significant effect on growth in Africa, has rested on 
state legitimacy. The quality of governance was thus higher in countries either where 
pre-colonial institutions survived in post-colonial states (vertically legitimate) or where 
pre-colonial ethnic populations remained undivided by the new borders of post-colonial 
states (horizontally legitimate). Basing their analysis on cross-country data on culture, 
Licht et al (2007) demonstrated that individual embeddedness/autonomy in groups had 
the most important effect on governance quality. Their findings were buttressed by 
language grammar characteristics (pronoun drops) as an instrumental variable for 
individual embeddedness. Even in the same countries, however, the efficiency aspect of 
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governance varied significantly from one location to another (Dollar et al. 2006).  
 
Democracy 
Unlike institutions and governance, democracy has been found to have no direct effect 
on growth. Przeworski et al. (2000) demonstrated that democracy neither promotes nor 
hampers economic growth. The type of regime made a difference only insofar as 
population growth was higher under a dictatorship than in a democracy.6 Political 
instability (extra-constitutional change of government) and policy uncertainty (unequal 
income distribution) significantly dampened economic growth while democracy had no 
significant impact on growth (Feng 2003). Neither did a time-series analysis of changes 
in democracy and economic growth yield any conclusive result. Granger causality was 
almost evenly split between cases from growth to democracy and those from democracy 
to growth (Heo and Tan 2001).7 
The fact that regime type did not make any notable difference among poor 
countries directed the attention of researchers to other factors such as low credibility of 
politicians among the voters (Keefer 2007). In new democracies, on the whole, 
politicians target only patrons or narrow groups when considering policies. This 
tendency was found to decline over the years in competitive elections (Keefer 2005). As 
an explanation of economic growth, this argument, however, takes us only from the 
practice of competitive elections to the number of such elections held. 
While democracy does not directly affect growth rates, it may exert an impact on 
individual aspects of economic growth. In this regard, Rodrik (2007, 153-183) makes 
two points. First, both long- and short-term growth rates were more stable in a 
democracy than under an autocracy, presumably due to the involvement of multiple 
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decision makers and thus the availability to democratic governments of diverse 
information. Second, democracy recovered more quickly from economic shocks than 
autocracy did.8 Indeed, Quinn and Woolley (2005) used cross-country analyses to show 
that voters punish the incumbent government not only for low growth but also for 
economic instability. It follows that they found that economic growth was more stable in 
democracies than in non-democracies. 
Democracy also influences factors of economic growth such as FDI flows and 
human capital development. A cross-country time-series analysis has provided evidence 
that democracy indirectly promotes growth by (1) increasing female life expectancy in 
poor countries and by (2) increasing female secondary school enrollment ratios in 
non-poor countries (Baum and Lake 2003). Jensen (2003) showed that FDI has flowed 
much more into democracies than into non-democracies. For post-communist states, 
previous studies pointed to a positive correlation between the level of economic reform 
and the level of democracy (See a review by Frye 2007).9 
The ambiguous effect of democracy on growth thus may lie in its different impacts 
on different sources of growth. There are few studies, however, that deal with both 
positive and negative effects of democracy on growth. An exception is the work of Pinto 
and Timmons (2005) who showed that political competition exerts a positive effect on 
human capital and productivity (measured by FDI/GDP, trade/GDP, and 
investment/growth) but a negative effect on investment/GDP and labor supply.  
Another complicating factor is that democracy is more associated with some 
aspects of institutions and governance than with others. Simple illustrations are given 
below. Among the six major components of governance, as defined by Kaufmann et al. 
(2007), the first one, voice and accountability, is measured by variables that are very 
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similar to those used for measuring democracy. In fact, the correlation between voice 
and accountability and the freedom score (mean of political rights and civil liberties, 
reversed), calculated by the author for 187 countries as of 2006, is extremely strong 
(r=0.96, p<0.001). The relationship between the voice and accountability variable (the 
proxy for democracy) and the other five variables was then examined by correlation 
(Table 1). 
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Table 1. Correlations between Democracy and Other Components of Governance (N=187) 
Governance components Pearson’s r*
Regulatory quality 0.8182
Rule of law 0.8125
Government efficiency 0.7889
Control of corruption 0.7863
Political stability 0.7032
Source: Calculated by the author from Kaufmann et al. (2007) . 
Notes: Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients between “voice and accountability” and other 
components of governance used by Kaufmann et al. (2007). 
*All statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
 
Although except for political stability, the correlation coefficients do not 
significantly differ from each other, a close examination of the scatter plots, shown in 
Figure 1 to Figure 5, arranged in the order of high to low correlation, reveals various 
patterns of bi-variate relationships. In particular, among relatively less strongly 
correlated patterns, the relationship between democracy and corruption is more 
curve-linear than linear (Figure 4). In other words, for control of corruption, democracy 
exerts a significant effect only after it reaches the mid-point level. Also, political 
stability shows a substantial variance among less democratic countries (Figure 5). Some 
non-democratic regimes are prone to conflict but others can sustain stability.  
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Figure 1. Democracy and Regulatory Quality, 2006 (N=187) 
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Source: Compiled by the author from Kaufmann et al. (2007). 
Notes: See notes in Table 1.  
r=0.8182, p<0.001. 
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Figure 2. Democracy and Rule of Law, 2006 (N=187) 
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Source: Same as Figure 1. 
Notes: See notes in Table 1.  
r=0.8125, p<0.001. 
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Figure 3. Democracy and Government Efficiency, 2006 (N=187) 
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Source: Same as Figure 1. 
Notes: See notes in Table 1.  
r=0.7889, p<0.001. 
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Figure 4. Democracy and Control of Corruption, 2006 (N=187) 
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Source: Same as Figure 1. 
Notes: See notes in Table 1.  
r=0.7863, p<0.001.
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Figure 5. Democracy and Political Stability, 2006 (N=187) 
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Source: Same as Figure 1. 
Notes: See notes in Table 1.  
r=0.703, p<0.001. 
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Conclusions 
This cursory literature review has discussed the direct and indirect effects of institutions, 
governance, and democracy on economic growth, and the following conclusions can be 
drawn. First, institutions and governance have a positive effect on growth. Even reforms 
that are less than comprehensive can stimulate, though not sustain, growth. Second, 
democracy neither promotes nor hampers growth directly. It secures stability and 
resilience in growth. It also exerts impacts on sources of growth but its net effect 
remains inconclusive. 
Methodologically, a major challenge for investigators is the simultaneity problem. 
It has become increasingly common to use an instrumental variable (such as settler 
mortality) to meet this problem. A cross-sectional analysis with a country dummy also 
helps to delineate (as outliers) unique factors that can be explained by qualitative (and 
comparative) methods. Such unique factors include de facto protection of property 
rights, deliberate resource reallocation, and elite pluralism in (pre-)colonial society.  
There remains unanswered the question of why institutions and governance matter 
but not democracy does not. The difference may be partly due to negative effects on 
investment and labor supply as well as the low credibility of young democracies. The 
increasing number of partial democracies, which have been rarely dealt with in the 
existing literature, may also need to be taken into account, for partial democracies 
manage their economies differently from stable autocracies and consolidated 
democracies.  
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Notes 
 
1 It has been the usual practice to refer to institutions without any modifier but 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) have separated economic from political institutions. Economic 
institutions were shaped by the relative power of political forces with conflicting 
economic preferences. While change in de facto political power can bring about change 
in economic institutions, the emergent political groups initiate changes in political 
institutions in order to prevent improvements in economic institutions from being 
retracted. 
2 For a criticism of this relatively narrow view of institutions, see Rodrik (2007, 
184-192). More generally, institutions are “the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interactions” that consist of formal and informal 
rules (North 1991, 97). 
3 Their analysis also revealed that the apparent geographical effect (i.e., good 
institutions under a temperate climate) depended on the general tendency for Europeans, 
who were not immune from tropical diseases, to migrate to temperate rather than 
tropical regions. The cultural explanation was also rejected when the effect of economic 
institutions was controlled for in the analysis. 
4 Since settler mortality rates were not available for Botswana, proxy variables such as 
the European population percentage in 1900 and population density in 1500 were used.  
5 These reforms pertained to inflation, trade and financial liberalization, budget deficits, 
privatization, and deregulation. 
6 These results require closer scrutiny, however, since there was evidence that both ends 
of the growth ranking were dominated by autocracies. 
7 There is evidence to show that change in income does not lead to democracy. The 
contemporary association between income and institutions disappears when the 
cross-country effect is controlled for in the panel data. The association can be explained 
instead by different historical paths over the last five centuries, one that facilitated both 
growth and democracy and the other that favored only one of them (Acemoglu et al. 
Forthcoming). 
8 This is probably because elections replace the tainted incumbent with a new 
government endorsed by popular vote. Democratic processes also help to nurture 
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consensus among groups hit by crises (Rodrik 2007). The extent of growth recovery 
after an exchange-rate devaluation, however, depended on the size of the governing 
coalition rather than on democracy (Hicken, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2005).  
9 Historically, in Britain, a series of franchise expansions beginning with the Reform 
Act of 1832, introduced in order to prevent a possible revolution, made economic 
institutions more reflective of working-class preferences (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006).  
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